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This paper reconsiders some themes and arguments from my earlier paper ‘‘Fairness, Respect and 
the Egalitarian Ethos.’’ That work is often considered to be part of a cluster of papers attacking ‘‘luck 
egalitarianism’’ on the grounds that insisting on luck egalitarianism’s standards of fairness undermines 
relations of mutual respect among citizens. While this is an accurate reading, the earlier paper did not 
make its motivations clear, and the current paper attempts to explain the reasons that led me to write 
the earlier paper, assesses the force of its arguments, and locates it in respect to work of Richard 
Arneson and Elizabeth Anderson. The paper concludes by bringing out what now appears to be the 
main message of the earlier paper: that the attempt to implement an ‘‘ideal’’ theory of equality can 




In 1998 I published a paper called ‘Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos’ (Wolff, 1998) which 
was an attempt to work out what I thought was wrong with the leading contemporary theories of 
equality in the analytic tradition. These theories gave a central place to the idea of individual 
responsibility within equality, and were very soon after to be given the name ‘luck egalitarianism’ by 
Elizabeth Anderson (1999). Along with Anderson and Scheffler (2003), my paper has sometimes been 
regarded as part of a critical reaction to luck egalitarianism, arguing that egalitarianism had failed to 
pay sufficient attention to issues of respect and self-respect. 
 
The purpose of my paper was indeed largely critical, although it did contain some sketchy remarks in a 
more positive direction. The general motivation of the paper was an attempt to work out my reasons 
for discontent with the theories of equality that dominated the literature I was familiar with: namely the 
work continuing a tradition that Jerry Cohen had introduced me to as a student at UCL. Jerry had been 
particularly impressed with the work of Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), and while he was later to make clear, 
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he wasn’t entirely satisfied with the details of Dworkin’s approach (Cohen, 1988), see also Arneson, 
1988), he was never less sure that Dworkin had made a major advance in egalitarian theory. 
 
 
From the mid-80s I had felt that I should have joined in the project of refining post-Dworkinian 
egalitarian theory, as others were doing, but my heart wasn’t in it. I eventually expressed some of this 
discontent in my 1998 paper. Looking back, now, though, I see that this papers contains a variety of 
complaints and concerns, not always properly distinguished from each other and none developed in 
sufficient detail. There is a limit to how much I can remedy the lack of development here, of course, 
but I can at least try to make out the main points with more care, or if not more care than at least more 
emphasis.  
 
In the first section of this paper I will set out the general difficulties I perceived in contemporary 
egalitarianism that led me to write the earlier paper, while the task of the second section will be to 
review the main arguments of that paper, with my current assessment of their force. The argument of 
the paper to have generated the most discussion is the example of ‘shameful revelation’, and I will 
make my observations on some responses to this argument, most notably from Arneson. In the final 
section I will explain why I do not endorse what Elizabeth Anderson has called ‘Democratic Equality’ 
as a possible alternative to luck egalitarianism and make some concluding remarks concerning the 
lessons I now draw from my earlier discussion. 
 




From the 1980’s one main current in egalitarianism thought has been to try to generate a theory of 
equality which resists the most telling criticisms offered by libertarians, yet remains true to the high 
standards of rigour of analytic philosophy. The major move in this direction was made by Ronald 
Dworkin, who set a new agenda for thinking about equality (Dworkin, 1981a, Dworkin 1981b, for 
discussion see Wolff, 2007). Yet while the motivations of this project seem firmly rooted in a concern 
for equality, and the ingenuity with which it has been developed is impressive, it seemed to me to have 
rather little to do with earlier traditions of thinking about equality and which one might hope to see 
political philosophers formulate in a precise manner. The tradition I have in mind is the line of thought 
running from the Levellers and Lockean Socialists, through Marxism, to the early 20th century English 
socialism of Orwell and Tawney. One great surprise, of course, is that Jerry Cohen’s own work did not 
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bring together Marxist and liberal egalitarian theory in the way in which one might have expected given 
his other philosophical concerns. 
 
There are a number of ways in which the liberal egalitarianism of analytical political philosophy failed 
to connect with these earlier socialist writers, and, it could be argued, suffers by comparison. In what 
follows in this section I will present a number of sources of dissatisfaction with liberal egalitarian 
theory. Many of the objections may seem exaggerated, or polemical, and to apply to some versions of 
the theory but not to others. Some of the criticisms may also seem unfair, or to have easy answers, 
but what I am trying to do here is to capture a sense of discontent, rather than to state a set of 
decisive objections. Suffice to say, though, I do think that the objections need to be taken into account 
in any comprehensive account of egalitarianism, and in this respect I must admit that in my own work I 
am still struggling. 
 
Note that I am considering a tradition that starts with Dworkin, rather than Rawls; a tradition which self-
consciously tries to incorporate a response to Nozick, or at least Nozick-like arguments. (Nozick, 
1974). How much of what I shall say also applies to Rawls is a further question, on which I will say 
little here, but on the whole Rawls will come off somewhat better than the post-Rawlsians. (Rawls 
1971, Hinton 2001). 
 
1(b) The Good Society 
 
A first apparent lack in contemporary theories of liberal egalitarianism is that they rarely seem to be 
animated by a vision of the good society. Of course by providing principles of justice it is possible to 
assess societies as better and worse, and hence comparative evaluation may in some cases be 
possible, but there is little sense of what would be a good way to live together. This agnosticism is, of 
course, part of what it is to be a liberal egalitarian, but in some ways it can seem unsatisfying. 
Traditional egalitarianism has a view of a society of equals with no one above me, no one below me, 
and based on some notion of community or common wealth. As has often been noted recently, on the 
socialist egalitarian view the goal of equality is not so much to achieve an equal distribution of material 
goods, but to create a society in which each individual can think of themselves as valued as an equal 
(Norman 1998, Miller 1994, Anderson 1999, Scheffler, 2003). By contrast, liberal egalitarianism can 
seem rather soulless; as if it begins with the idea of equality before the law, and then pushes it, via 
anti-discrimination, and active equality of opportunity, ultimately to include equal access to private 
property. Communitarianism has been the most obvious attempt to recover the idea that political 
philosophy needs to recognise that its subjects are human beings, rather than bundles of ambitions 
and endowments, but communitarianism has only partially been integrated into egalitarian thought, by 
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means of Michael Walzer, and it has generated only a limited amount of systematic discussion as to 
how communitarian egalitatarianism should be understood (Walzer 1983, Miller and Walzer, 1994). 
 
1(c) Materialism and Anti-Materialism 
 
Related to the absence of a vision of a good society is a second concern. For those who came to 
egalitarianism from a reading of the classic works of socialism it can come to seem very strange that 
liberal egalitarianism is so focused on the question of the distribution of material goods. Consider the 
romantic anti-materialism exemplified in the work of thinkers such as William Morris. How important 
are material goods? On any view material goods are, of course, necessary to achieve a certain level 
of well-being and dignity, and that one of the problems of contemporary society is that far too may 
people have far too little. However on many socialist views, beyond a certain point a concern with 
material values is a sign of corrupted values and priorities. These socialist views tell us that material 
goods are relatively unimportant and where we can, we should transcend our interest in them. Liberal 
egalitarianism, in comparison, appears to assume that material goods are so important that we should 
make sure that everyone has an equal share. 
 
Such an emphasis on material equality can seem almost a betrayal of ideas animating equality, as it 
highlights the way in which people are at odds with each other, rather than seeing themselves as 
members of a supportive collective enterprise. Material goods are typically ‘rival’ in the economists’ 
sense that if something is possessed or enjoyed by one person it cannot be possessed or enjoyed by 
another, and hence social justice essentially provides rules to settle competition over desirable scare 
goods. However not all goods have this rival or competitive structure. Consider, for example, goods 
arising out of companionship, community, friendship or belonging. There is a not a fixed pot of 
friendship. Of course it could happen that making friends with one person means losing another friend, 
but equally it is possible that within a group over time they all increasingly enjoy the goods of 
friendship without anyone suffering a loss. 
 
There are, then, goods which, in Tawney’s words, ‘to divide is not to take away’ (Tawney, 1931, p. 
291). A socialism inspired by, Tawney, or by William Morris or Oscar Wilde, plays down the 
importance of the acquisition and consumption of material goods, and the conflict and rivalry that goes 
with it, substituting an emphasis on the enjoyment of what can be shared, rather than privately 
consumed: art, culture, conversation, and companionship as well as the development of a many-sided 





So far, then, I have stated two related general objections to, or at least concerns with, liberal 
egalitarianism. First, it lacks a positive vision of the good society; second it seems overly concerned 
with settling conflicts over the division of material goods. A third objection is that it typically gives 
rather little attention to the production side of economic life. A Marxist analysis begins with the 
concepts of land, capital and labour, looking at who currently controls, and receives income flows, 
from them, and how an economy could be arranged for the common good in future society. Liberal 
egalitarianism starts in a different place; apparently with a model of human beings who look 
suspiciously like the modern office worker: consumers who have salaried jobs in large organisations, 
which are a burden in proportion to the hours of leisure that need to be sacrificed, and a benefit in 
proportion to the amount of income they yield. Many liberal egalitarian theories make no reference to 
modern economic realities; their theories are stated at an abstract level. Where differential conditions 
of production are mentioned we are given examples of individual rural entrepreneurs (the hard-
working market-gardener) rather than the multi-national joint-stock company owned by a combination 
of other institutions managing money on behalf of investment funds, pension funds, and a small 
number of wealthy individuals, which is the dominant ownership pattern of modern capitalism. On the 
whole, liberal egalitarianism simply ignores many aspects of the economy. These include the 
ownership of the means of production; the management of production; the consequent distribution of 
income that follows more or less directly from the ownership of the means of production; banking; 
finance; and the ways in which different forms of work can be differentially a benefit and burden 
(Gomberg, 2007). 
 
One response is to argue that nevertheless what matters is the condition of individual lives, and that 
the organisation of work and the economy is primarily an instrumental question. So, for example, 
Rawls is often read as arguing that what matters is the level of income and wealth of the worst off in 
society, and therefore we need to arrange the economy in whatever way will make the worst off as 
well off as possible. Whether this means a planned economy, market socialism, welfare capitalism, 
laissez-faire capitalism, or a property-owning democracy is merely a question of means. This may 
seem a liberating move, but few contemporary egalitarians have taken seriously the point on which 
Marx criticised Mill: that one cannot treat production and distribution as separate issues, for the two 
will inevitably interact. Income distribution will inevitably reflect patterns of ownership of productive 






Finally it is worth highlighting liberal egalitarians’ concentration on issues of individual responsibility, 
especially as the focus of the attention has been the responsibility of those towards the bottom of the 
income distribution. There has been a great deal of attention to the question of the circumstances 
under which those who are unemployed should receive or, conversely, forfeit, welfare benefits. Yet it 
seems odd for those who profess themselves to be egalitarians to want to spend so much effort on the 
question of how to make the distinction between the deserving and the non-deserving poor. In 
response, it will be said that every theory will have to work out some way of dealing with issues of 
responsibility, and, in the end, this may well have the consequence that some welfare claimants will 
have their claims disallowed. This I grant, but I would also make two observations. First, egalitarians 
seem not to have been so concerned about the distinction between the deserving and undeserving 
rich: should they not also press hard for a distinction between ‘earned’ and ‘unearned’ income, with 
differential tax rates, as the British Labour Government of the 60s and 70s enforced? Or if they have 
reasons to reject such a distinction, should this not be brought out into the open? Second, while it is 
true that any theory of responsibility will have consequences for the poor, it seems odd that this issue 




Section 2. Themes from Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos 
 
2 (a) Introduction 
 
The previous section has set out some of the background concerns that led me to question 
contemporary egalitarianism in the mid-1990s. I do not think I had formulated all these concerns but 
they were lurking in the background. They crystallised in a somewhat different form in my 1998 paper, 
and in this section I review what I take to be the major points from that paper and to give my current 
view of their force.  
 
 
2(b) Abstract examples 
 
My earlier paper was, in effect, an attempt to rescue egalitarianism from the distorting effects caused 
by taking libertarianism too seriously. One way in which the influence of libertarianism is apparent in 
concentration on the idea of responsibility in the resulting theory, as mentioned above, and this will be 
a major focus of what follows. However there is another way in which libertarianism – in the particular 
form in which it is presented by Nozick – has also had its effect. This is the methodology of using very 
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abstract examples, often depicting a small number of people in quite bizarre situations, as a way of 
helping formulate, hone and assess proposed principles. Nozick understands that he is doing political 
philosophy in a new style, and one which owes a great deal to standards of argument in contemporary 
epistemology, especially in the wake of Gettier and the attempt to generate a water-tight definition of 
knowledge by means of ‘theory, counter-example, patch-condition, counter-example’ and so on. In 
Nozick we find examples of a person who can only get exercise by swinging a baseball bat in such a 
way that it smashes the head of a cow, and another person who can only get exercise by throwing 
books through your open window. There must be dozens, perhaps even hundreds, of examples like 
this in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, while there are very few in A Theory of Justice. Nozick was 
probably not the first person to argue in this style in value theory (Judith Jarvis Thomson’s  paper on 
abortion pre-dates Nozick by a few years, Thomson 1971) but the egalitarian literature generally looks 
more like Nozick than Rawls (Wolff, forthcoming). 
 
Now, one may feel that this may be a notable fact from the point of view of the sociology of political 
philosophy, but it may be harder to see why it should be a problem. The advantages of this method 
are obvious: if one advances a principle that yields counter-intuitive consequences for particular 
examples then there is a difficulty. Normally the difficulty is taken to be that the principle is, strictly 
speaking false, and therefore, at the least, requires amendment. Or, to go the other way, it may be 
possible to explain why the consequences are not counter-intuitive after all. But in any case the use of 
abstract counter-examples yields benefits in precision, and possibly depth, of view. Hence it is clear 
that abstraction is not a problem in itself, and, indeed, is unavoidable. No statement of any example 
can be true to all the subtleties of the case, and so abstraction is always present, and hence only ever 
a matter of degree. 
 
Could it be, though, that the methodology is misleading in its promise of precision? After all, the 
method has not proven conspicuously successful even where it is most at home, in the theory of 
knowledge. Perhaps we should take notice of Aristotle’s dictum that we should not expect from ethics 
and politics the level of precision that we seek in mathematics, and therefore the method pre-
supposes that an unattainable level of precision is an appropriate goal. Now, while there is something 
comforting in the idea, the level of precision an area can bear is, partly at least, an experimental 
question, and it would be unsatisfactory to give up too early. Once more rigour and precision is a good 
thing, not a problem, and if the use of abstract counter-examples can help in this respect, then so 
much the better. 
 
Abstraction, then, is not a problem in itself; nor is the search for precision. Could the problem be, 
though, that the method is distracting? Myles Burnyeat, in a famous review of two authors’ works on 
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Plato, suggested that one of them suffered from the problem that it was that it was ‘all vision and no 
argument’ while the other was ‘all argument and no vision’. Whether this was a fair assessment of the 
books under review I will have to leave to others, but perhaps we can agree with Burnyeat’s lesson: 
that good philosophy needs both vision and argument (Burnyeat, 1979). This danger of the method of 
abstraction is that it encourages argument, at the cost of vision. However, one can accept that there is 
such a danger, and thank those who point it out for their concern, yet simply take it as a warning that 
refining principles by means of abstract examples can only be part of one’s project. It would be absurd 
to think that using the method of abstraction excludes vision; after all one can hardly accuse Nozick of 
lacking vision, which is distinct from the question of whether we find his vision attractive. 
 
What, after all, then is the problem of abstraction? As I now see it, the point can be made rather 
simply. Any example contains limited information, and very abstract examples will typically contain 
very little. There is, thus, a hidden assumption that nothing else is relevant; that all other things are 
equal. By focusing only on abstract examples we are in danger of not taking account of all pertinent 
features of the cases that are of interest in practical life. Again this is a danger rather than a necessary 
consequence, and the charge needs to be made out in detail. However, in this case I think it can be 
made out in detail, and it is something I will return to below. 
 
2(c) A Principle of Justice 
 
Much of contemporary egalitarianism has been concerned with the task of formulating the correct 
principle of egalitarian justice. There is a great deal to be said about the role of principles in intellectual 
endeavour. Principles seem to be privileged, and can be very powerful. The allure of a principle is that 
with a small number of concepts, formulated in the right relations, pronouncements can be made over 
what before appeared to be a wide range of disparate phenomena. In the sciences these 
pronouncements are often explanations or predictions of events, and hold out the hope either of 
control or rational response. In the realm of values principles offer a normative standard which then 
permits judgement again over an unlimited range of cases. The ideal appears to be that principles 
should be simple to state; that there should be very few of them (ideally just one), and that they should 
have very wide – perhaps universal – application, rather like the law of gravity, perhaps. 
 
But should we really expect to be able to devise principles of such nature in political philosophy? It is a 
lively matter of debate in the philosophy of science as to whether or not there are ‘real’ laws of nature, 
and if so how they fit together. Much of western intellectual pursuit has been conducted as if God 
wrote a highly elegant and fully consistent ‘book of nature’ and for reasons of his own set human 
beings the challenge of trying to recreate it, based on the clues that he left sprinkled around the 
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natural world. Yet if we reject this image of science and of the world we are left with some powerful 
question, such as there: Why should there be laws or principles? Why should they be fairly simple to 
state? Why should they be few in number? Why should they be consistent? Even if we think that 
political philosophy should be modelled on science, why take classical mechanics as the model rather 
than, say, medicine? These questions are even more pressing in moral and political enquiry than they 
are in science, given that each value has a history and development which could easily bring it into 
conflict with other values. Those searching for a fundamental principle of equality, which is true to the 
concerns that motivate egalitarians and also has wide application, owe us some reason to think that 
this is a task that could possibly bear fruit. A better response still, of course, would be to produce the 
principle. 
 
2(d) An Ethos of Equality 
 
For reasons such as this I suggested in my earlier paper that it is better to see egalitarianism as 
constituted not in terms of a fundamental principle of justice, but in terms of what I called there an 
‘ethos’. Whether or not the term ‘ethos’ is helpful, the key idea there was that egalitarianism starts 
from a collection of values, not principles, and, as I suggested in my earlier papers, those values 
include fairness and respect. The heart of the paper, of course, was to argue that there is no 
guarantee that these values can always be jointly pursued, and, indeed, they can conflict in some 
case (I use an abstract example to make the point). Egalitarians need to manage their way around 
that conflict, somehow or other, when it arises. My own feeling is that we are unlikely to be able to 
guarantee a permanent, stable, solution, and that we are likely to have to compromise. However the 
compromise may well change over time as we try to adjust to changing circumstances, and, indeed, 
changing emphasis on different values. 
 
 
2(e) Fairness, Respect and Shameful Revelation 
 
The main argument of my earlier paper was based around an argument that purports to show that 
there can be a tension between two egalitarian values: fairness and respect. The argument is that the 
responsibility element in egalitarianism – incorporated in order to ensure that redistribution takes place 
only when it is fair to do so – leads to the view that individuals are entitled to help only when their 
plight is in the relevant sense outside their own control. In the example of welfare benefits for the 
unemployed the doctrine appears to entail that individuals will be entitled to receive unemployment 
benefit only if they are unemployed for reasons that are outside their own sphere of responsibility. 
Specifically, those unemployed through choice would not be morally entitled to unemployment benefit. 
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Consequently, in order to prevent individuals from benefiting unfairly, those making decisions about 
who should receive unemployment benefit need to be able to distinguish between those who are 
unemployed by choice and those who are unemployed through lack of relevant opportunity. 
 
Consider now a situation in which there is no general problem of unemployment, and, on the whole, 
those who seek jobs manage to obtain them. Under such circumstances, therefore, anyone who has 
difficulty getting or keeping a job must presumably either lack the talents other people standardly 
have, or have some sort of character trait that renders him or her unattractive on the job market. In 
such circumstance such a person will have to make out the case to the welfare officers that he or she 
lacks talent or is otherwise undesirable from the point of view of the labour market, if a claim for 
unemployment benefit is to be upheld. Yet this will be humiliating; it undercuts self-respect, and may 
well lower one’s standing in the eyes of others, given that, as a matter of contingent but stubborn fact, 
an ability to contribute to society’s productive work is considered so important in the contemporary 
world. Note that under such conditions the mere receipt of unemployment benefit would be an 
indication of one’s unemployability. 
 
The example was intended to show that fairness and respect can conflict: more precisely the 
responsibility element incorporated into luck egalitarianism forces a distinction between those who are 
responsible for their difficulties and those who are not, and in some cases it can be humiliating to have 
to reveal – first to oneself and then to others – that one lacks talents others have. This is why the term  
‘shameful revelation’ is used, and the suggestion is that those who have to make shameful revelations 
are not treated as equals. 
 
There is, of course, a question of what this argument really shows. It was never intended to show that 
fairness and respect are in contradiction in the sense that they can never be jointly satisfied. And so it 
has often been pointed out in reply to me – as I pointed out myself -  if it was not regarded as 
shameful to lack employable talents then there would be no problem. Indeed there would be no 
problem if everyone had a job and no-one claimed unemployment benefit. My point was not intended 
to be fully general. Rather, in the circumstances of the actual world, going through a test, required 
from the point of view of fairness, to see if one meets the conditions for state support specified by luck 
egalitarianism, can be experienced as humiliating, and produce in the individual concerned the 
thought that they are not respected as an equal, even though the theory declares them deserving of 
help. 
 
Now, in my earlier paper I anticipated several responses. Those who believe that the currency of 
justice is welfare can argue that humiliation is a welfare loss. This is perfectly plausible. However a 
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great deal depends on the next step in the argument. If welfare is treated as something like preference 
satisfaction, and is fully commensurable, then welfare can typically be addressed by financial 
compensation, and therefore those who are humiliated should, on this view, receive financial 
compensation for their humiliation. Yet, I also suggested, this could possibly make matters even worse 
by compounding humiliation rather than overcoming it. Hence to turn this response into an adequate 
reply it appears necessary to accept that well-being is complex in nature, with some partially non-
substitutable elements.  
 
Once, though, it is recognised that humiliation is a welfare loss that cannot easily be compensated, it 
is possible to suggest that, therefore, where humiliation is anticipated steps should be taken to avoid 
its occurrence. This has been argued with particular force by Arneson (Arneson, 2000).  Arneson’s 
view is now what he calls as ‘responsibility-catering prioritarianism’. It is a form of aggregative 
consequentialism that requires first of all, an assessment of each person’s welfare, and then, in 
calculating the desirability of outcomes, two weighting factors are introduced, prior to aggregation. 
One is to take account of responsibility: the more outcomes track individual responsibility, the higher 
the ‘moral value’. The second is that the lower one is placed in the distribution array, the greater the 
moral value in any increase in one’s welfare. The question, then, of whether there should be a 
conditional benefit test for unemployment benefit now turns on the question of whether having such a 
test would increase aggregate moral value. The presence of the test would allow greater 
correspondence between responsibility and outcomes, and hence gets a positive evaluation on that 
score, but in so far as the humiliation it causes creates a welfare loss for the worst off, this creates a 
heavily weighted negative factor. In the end, then, whether society should have the test depends on 
how the sums work out: what the inputs are, and what the weighting factor is.  
 
In principle, then, both results – using a test and not using it - are possible, and so let us consider 
them. Suppose the sums work out so that we continue to insist on the test. This would be justified as 
consistent with the form of prioritarianism that Arneson endorses; a weighted form of priority rather 
than absolute. On such a view it is a commonplace that even the worst off can suffer a loss if the 
aggregated benefits – in this case the total moral value – is high enough. Humiliation, or loss of self-
respect is nothing special, it is just one more thing to be put in the balance, and if the sums work out a 
particular way we should accept that the worst off in society can justifiably be made worse off in this 
way. (Of course there may be ways of mitigating their humiliation, and I will return to this.) I concede 
that I am prepared to accept this conclusion in modified form. If unconditional benefits led to extremely 
unfavourable consequences, then, reluctantly, we should consider introducing conditional tests, even 
if it leads to shameful revelation. Yet it still seems to me that we should give a particularly high 
emphasis to avoiding humiliation of the worst off. 
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Consider, though, the alternative and that the sums come out the other way, and that the welfare loss 
caused by humiliation is considerable. On this view the benefits achieved by tracking fair outcomes is 
outweighed by the weighted welfare loss of the worst off. In such a case society would no longer insist 
on a conditional test, even though responsibility would be less well tracked. However, no-one would 
be humiliated. Responsibility-catering prioritarianism, it seems, no longer would have a responsibility 
test, and might even propose unconditional unemployment benefit. But then something strange has 
happened for it would turn out that responsibility catering prioritarianism would not actually implement 
the responsibility catering element, at least with respect to unemployment benefits for the poorly off. 
This does not make it entirely self-effacing, for it provides a theoretical way of evaluating the relative 
benefits of different outcomes, but nevertheless it presents a striking difference between theory and 
practice. In general, though, it is unclear whether or not responsibility catering prioritarianism will give 
sufficient weight to responsibility to impose the test; or sufficient weight to the humiliation of the worst 
off to oppose it. Cases, no doubt, will differ, but it is interesting to note that despite its name Arneson’s 
responsibility catering prioritarianism is consistent with abandoning the responsibility catering element. 
 
 
Alongside this response, however, Arneson and others have made another. I have assumed that 
forcing individuals to reveal their talent status is, first, required by a fairness test, and second, more 
humiliating for those individuals than leaving their talents unrevealed. Both can be questioned, and 
have caused me certain discomfort about the example. Let me take them in reverse order. 
 
My main unease about the case concerns the argument that being forced to consider the issue of 
whether or not one is unemployed through choice or through lack of talent can require one to face up 
to the fact that one has no employable talents, and can be humiliating. If one could, instead, believe 
that one was unemployed through choice – that none of the jobs on offer are sufficiently appealing – 
this would allow one to retain self-respect. But what worries me – and not only me - is that this is a 
rather unappealing way of maintaining self-respect; essentially through self-deception. Would it not, 
perhaps, be better for self-respect to face up to one’s problems so that it becomes more likely that one 
will do something to overcome them? 
 
This, then, leads to the second concern; that even if institutions are concerned about fairness, they 
need not act in such humiliating ways. Sensitive interviews which allow people to recognise and build 
up whatever talents they have, and to overcome their difficulties, could serve the dual purpose of 
screening out fraudulent claimants, while building up self-respect. Hence it is arguable that fairness 
does not require humiliating interventions even in the circumstances of the actual world (Brown, 2009). 
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The lesson from the discussion is more complex, therefore, than I initially supposed, and I will come 
back in the following sections to say more about what I now think should be taken from the example. 
First, though, I want to note that while the responses made so far are available on a prioritarian 
welfarist view, a prioritarian resource based view does not have recourse to similar lines of escape. 
Those who wish to maximize the wealth and income of the worst off – whether absolute or weighted 
priority, whether responsibility-catering or not – must assess outcomes simply in terms of whether they 
maximize twealth and income. Humiliation is not even a factor to put in the balance. If it turns out that 
the way to maximize the wealth and income of the worst off is to introduce measures which undermine 
their self-respect to such a degree that their life is a torment, so be it. For obvious reasons this strikes 
me as a very unappealing view, and the argument from shameful revelation is simply one more way of 
bringing out what is so problematic in an index which ignores everything except money. 
 
2(f) Transition and theory of second best 
 
Before returning to question of what, in detail, I now take from the argument from shameful revelation, 
I want to address the question of whether or not I think of myself as a critic of luck egalitarianism. As 
mentioned above, the term ‘luck egalitarianism’ was not introduced into the published literature until a 
year after I published the paper under discussion, and indeed the term places in a single category a 
number of theorists who conceived of themselves as engaged in a detailed debate, rather than 
members of a particular camp or movement. But in any case my intention in that paper was not to 
reject luck egalitarianism as a theory of fair shares, but rather to argue that the fairness perspective is 
too limited and can do harm. As I now see it, the part of the force of my argument can be put in terms 
of the now fashionable questioning of ‘ideal theory’. Even if there are ideal circumstances in which the 
demands of equality could be fully realised by luck egalitarianism, it does not follow from this that what 
we ought to do in the real world is to implement as much of luck egalitarianism as we can. 
 
This point can be seen most clearly in respect to a (simplified) version of Dworkin’s equality of 
resources. Suppose we represent Dworkin’s theory as suggesting that there are two elements to 
equality, First of all, society has to create the background of equality of resources, and then, second, it 
should make people bear the true social costs of their freely made choices. Suppose, now, that policy 
makers are convinced, and decide to take whatever steps they can to bring about that world. It seems 
that it will be much easier to make people responsible for the social costs of their choices than it would 
be to provide background equality of resources. Yet if policy makers decide to do what they can to 
make people responsible for their choices, without first implementing background equality, then what 
results is not halfway to equality but laissez-faire libertarianism.  
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Consequently we need to think hard about the relation between ideal theory and practical politics. 
What I think the last argument shows is that we cannot simply take our preferred theory and 
implement whichever parts of it are easiest to apply. Indeed this is a version of the theory of second-
best in economics, which suggests that aiming for a ‘first-best’ solution may be very foolish, for the 
costs of aiming and missing could be very high. Consequently aiming at a ‘second-best’ solution could 
be preferable, either because it is achievable, or because aiming at it, yet failing to achieve it, will still 
lead to an acceptable outcome, and one that is better than what would result from failing to achieve 
the first best solution. However it may be that aiming for the second best solution can put the first best 
solution permanently out of reach, and this is a cost that, on balance, it may be worth paying. 
 
In sum, even for those who believe luck egalitarianism to be the ideal theory, there is still a great deal 
of thinking to do about whether we should aim to implement it in the real world; whether there is a path 
from here to there; what the steps are in the path; and in what order they should be attempted. Only 
with answers to these questions can we decide whether or not it would be better to aim for a second-
best solution. The case of shameful revelation can be taken as an illustration of how the process could 
go wrong, and to point out the need for broader reflection. 
 
2 (g) Adverse effects of well-meaning action 
 
Whether or not the case of shameful revelation is as clear cut as I hoped in showing a tension 
between fairness and respect, it remains obvious that there are circumstances in which attempts to 
implement a fairness test can undermine self-respect. However, it may be that there will generally be 
more subtle and sensitive instruments available to implement policies based on a concern for fairness 
which also boost, or at least do not undermine, self-respect. Nevertheless, the example was intended 
only to be a more specific and focused version of an old argument which goes back to the foundation 
of the poor laws, and afflicts all welfare states: that very often various forms of qualification tests are 
used to check whether individuals are entitled to the benefits that they claim, and those who are 
subject to these tests – whether for housing or unemployment benefit, or for disability allowance – 
have often experienced them as demeaning, even when the purpose of the test is simply to verify the 
basis of a claim. Those who experience government help can find the manner of that help oppressive. 
 
The contrast between fairness and respect, and how the two can thus be in tension, can be seen as 
an example of a much wider phenomenon, and whether or not that particular example works well, the 
existence of general phenomenon seems clear. A first attempt to generalise it, and this accords well 
with current debates in egalitarianism, is to see the conflict as an instance of a broader conflict 
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between distributive and social models of equality. Distributive models aim to distribute goods in a fair 
and equal manner; social models aim to generate a society in which individuals can view each other 
as equals. The example of shameful revelation, as well as many of Elizabeth Anderson’s examples, 
are intended to show that a concern with distributional fairness can undermine people sense of being 
an equal, among others, in their society. 
 
Once more, however, it is unclear that there is a necessary tension between the goals. It is possible, 
of course, to show that clumsy attempts to achieve distributional equality can undermine people’s 
sense of belonging to a society of equals, but this does not mean that our only options are clumsy 
ones. And indeed I now think it is possible to reconcile a concern for both distributional and social 
equality by being clear about the goods social equality brings people, and having a wide enough 
concept of well-being, and a wide enough concept of distribution, so that there ‘goods’ are also 
included as those to be distributed, at least indirectly, by government action (cf Wolff and de-Shalit, 
2007). 
 
Yet the apparent conflict can be seen in still broader terms: simply that well-meaning government 
action can make people better off in one respect but worse off in others. A classic example of this in 
the UK is various post-war housing schemes which removed people from the ‘slums’: unsanitary, over-
crowded, poor quality housing, and removing them to newly built, modern, convenient, flats in tower 
blocks. In terms of the criteria of the housing departments such moves are a great success, but in 
many cases the dislocation from existing neighbourhoods and communities caused a huge amount of 
damage and long-term harm. For many years libertarians such as Friedman have pointed out that 
government action typically has negative externalities. Egalitarians need to recognise that these 
negative externalities can fall on the very people that governments are trying to help. In some cases 
those people will still be better off as a result, in other cases clearly worse, and in still other cases it 
may be indeterminate, with no clear fact of the matter. To understand how that could be, some sort of 
pluralist view of well-being is needed. This, perhaps, is the final message of my earlier paper, even 
though it was aimed at much more localised target. And, once more, there is no attempt to argue that 
there is a necessary tension, but rather that policy makers must always keep in mind the possibility 
that making people better off in one respect may make them worse off in some other, and it is not 
always clear whether or not they have been made better off overall. 
 
3 Anderson’s Democratic Equality 
 
Before closing I want to make some comments about Anderson’s theory of Democratic Equality, and 
especially why, although I agree with many elements of her account, I do not endorse her approach to 
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equality, the central core of which is that a society of equals will guarantee to individuals a particular 
‘sufficient’ level of capabilities.  
 
First, though, a word about the guarantee. Note that it is couched in the language of capabilities rather 
than functionings, which allows Anderson to argue that a society of equals need not subsidize those 
who could work, but are not prepared to do so (1999, 328). This is important for Anderson for she 
wants to avoid the libertarian charge that equality subsidised the undeserving who chose not to work. 
Such people, Anderson suggests, do not lack capabilities, and so there is no case for subsidy. But 
note that to implement such a policy we need, once more, to check who lacks a functioning through 
choice and who lacks it through lack of capability. In other words, despite her trenchant critical 
response to luck egalitarianism she shares their endorsement of conditional benefits. Hence if there is 
a problem with shameful revelation then it affects Anderson as much as Dworkin, Cohen and Arneson. 
Indeed it is unclear how she will escape some of her own criticisms of their views, and there seems to 
be a larger element of luck egalitarianism in her own view than she is prepared to own up to. 
 
But that internal criticism aside, any type of sufficiency view faces a battery of objections, especially 
concerning the fetishism of setting any particular level of sufficiency. Anderson is not the first person to 
suggest that the way to solve this problem is in functional terms: sufficiency means ‘sufficient to 
achieve some goal or function’. One reason why Anderson’s theory is called ‘democratic equality’ is 
that it sets the threshold using political concepts: what is necessary to function as an equal citizen in 
one’s society (1999, 316-321). Now there are two closely related difficulties with setting the sufficiency 
threshold in this way. The first is that it is unclear that everything we feel that individuals should be 
guaranteed access to in developed societies relates to their role as citizens. Housing, nutrition, and 
health, are necessary for taking one’s role as a citizen, but it is unclear that we would define adequate 
levels in terms of what it necessary to act as a citizen. Certainly, and this is the second point, they are 
regarded as valuable independent of any role they have in allowing people to act as citizens. People 
are not provided with housing in order to function as citizens. Even if democratic equality hits the right 
threshold (which I don’t believe it does) it does so for the wrong reason. 
 
Perhaps, for this reason, Anderson widens the functional role of the capabilities to those we need ‘as a 
human being, as a participant in a system of cooperative production, and as a citizen of a democratic 
state’ (Anderson 1999, 317). Now including the idea of what one needs as a human being overcomes 
the objections just mentioned, but at the cost of losing the critical edge of the theory, and making it 
broad to the point of vagueness. There is nothing especially ‘democratic’ in deciding that people ought 
to have enough to be able to function as a human being or as a member of a co-operative workforce. 
Indeed it appears that no threshold has really be set, and we are left in difficulties in understanding 
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what Anderson’s view really comes to. So while, of course, I am sympathetic to her approach it is not 
determinate enough to know whether one can agree with it. 
 
But in conclusion, my 1998 paper attempts to make a very specific point about a tension in 
egalitarianism, and the difficulties of combining different egalitarian values. I now think that there are 
ways of overcoming some of these tensions, although work does need to be done to do so. However 
the main point I take from the paper still holds, I believe, even if it now seems rather bland. It is simply 
that things are very likely to go badly wrong if we set out an ideal theory of equality and then attempt 
to implement it in the real world without a great deal of further thought about how it would actually 
impact on people, and the relations between them. In the worst case, our best efforts can hurt the very 
people we set out to help. 
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